Date: 23 June, 2026 Time: 11 AM Venue: Aula Schiavoni, DEIB

Abstract (joint work with Tarun Menon): Should values influence core features of scientific reasoning? Defenders of the value-free ideal say no. Yet, it has become fashionable to declare that the value-free ideal for science is dead. That is the first new dogma of empiricism. It follows from that dogma that some value influence on scientific reasoning is permissible or even obligatory, and the premise that we must determine which values can legitimately have such influence, and under what conditions, is the other new dogma of empiricism. The key argument in favour of the two dogmas is the “argument from inductive risk”. In this paper we raise several objections to this argument. These objections are occasionally noted in existing literature, but their full implication never stated. Both dogmas are ill founded.

Jacob Stegenga is President’s Chair Professor of Philosophy at NTU Singapore and Chair of the School of Humanities. He previously taught at the University of Cambridge and in the United States and Canada. He has published widely in philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine. His current research interests include values in science and ethics of war. He is the author of Medical Nihilism, described as a “landmark work”, Care and Cure: An Introduction to Philosophy of Medicine, and most recently Heart of Science.